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Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?
ETHAN J. LEIBt
INTRODUCTION
Every election cycle a great number of citizens take to
the polls to vote on public policy matters directly. Direct
democracy has problems. And an account of deliberative
democracy-far from being a source to critique direct
democracy-might provide a solution.
I have three goals here. First, I hope to identify some
problems with the mechanisms of direct democracy that
most states and many cities throughout the country employ:
the initiative and the referendum. Next, I will offer a
potential solution to these institutional problems using
aspects of the theory of deliberative democracy, a theory
often marshaled to undermine direct democracy. Finally, I
will spell out why this design project should be of especial
interest to lawyers.
Before I turn to my discussion of direct democracy, let
me offer a working definition of deliberative democracy.
Deliberative democracy is a theoretical account of proper
democratic decision-making. It holds that the legitimacy of
decisions can be increased if such decisions are preceded by
authentic deliberation.' What is authentic deliberation? It
is deliberation that is as free as possible from the
distortions of unequal power and big money.2 There are
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of California-Hastings College of the
Law. Visiting Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Fall 2006). J.D., Ph.D.
(Political Science), M.A., B.A., Yale University; M. Phil., University of
Cambridge. I thank Eli Mark for research assistance and the participants in
faculty workshops at Hastings and SUNY-Buffalo for comments.
1. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 72-73 (James
Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
2. See id.
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many versions of deliberative democracy, but at their core
they all share a commitment to deliberation over ways of
measuring preferences that are not preceded by
deliberation.3 Deliberation is held to be valuable because it
contributes to the legitimacy of the democratic decision
ultimately made.
Most people are generally familiar with the practices of
direct democracy. American direct democracy exists in
twenty-seven states in the form of the referendum and the
initiative. 4 We will have to leave recall to one side; it is an
anomaly in any case, existing in no more than eighteen
states. 5 The referendum is a mechanism that enables
legislatures to have citizens ratify or reject a statute or
state constitutional amendment;6 the initiative, by contrast,
allows citizens to get a ballot measure before the populace
directly.7 Initiatives and referenda can address relatively
mundane issues like the management of noxious weeds in
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003);
Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3
ELECTION L.J. 685 (2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, supra). See generally
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004).
4. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1587-89 (1990); see also Initiative & Referendum Institute,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewidei&r.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2006)
(providing a breakdown of the twenty-seven states that permit initiatives or
referenda or both). As of a few years ago, more than two-thirds of the population
lived in either a city or state with the initiative-and most indications show
that this number will only grow. See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE
FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 8 (2004).
5. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 125-56 (1999); see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, RECALL OF STATE OFFICIALS (March 21, 2006),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/recallprovision.htm (summarizing
recall provisions for statewide and legislative officers in eighteen states that
have the recall). Some recent helpful reflections on the recall can be found in
Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 239 (2004), and Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The
Top Ten Constitutional Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 927 (2004).
6. See Eule, supra note 4 at 1510-12.
7. See id. at 1511. Initiatives can be statutory or constitutional-and they
can be "direct" or "indirect." "Indirect" initiatives (allowed by a relatively small
number of states) enable voters to refer a proposition to the legislature;
depending on legislative reaction and state-by-state rules, the voters may
ultimately decide on the fate of the proposition in a direct election. For the most
part, I focus here on "direct" initiatives.
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Montana;8 yet they can also address some of the most
contentious legal issues of our time: affirmative action,9
physician-assisted suicide, 10 and gay marriage."
Lurking behind these mechanisms is a recognition that
our representative democracy is often too remote from the
people. Legislators routinely have perverse incentives in
their law-making activities and they are notoriously
constrained by the need to finance their campaigns and
pander to the wealthy and powerful. Direct democracy can
serve as a check upon them. Additionally, direct democracy
is a way to acknowledge the extreme coercive force of the
state and give citizens a direct say in their government.
Popular sovereignty, as an aspiration, holds that each
citizen should be the author of his or her own laws in some
real, concrete way. 12 This is a republican conception of
freedom that remains uncomfortable with tacit consent, a
concept usually used to justify the social contract. We no
longer abide by a definition of republicanism that excludes
direct democracy in favor of representation: most states and
many cities have embraced direct democracy and the
Supreme Court, in 1912, refused to rule direct democracy
unconstitutional under the Republican Form of Government
Clause in Article 4, Section 4 in a case called Pacific
8. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 6, added by MONT. CONST. amend. 40 (2004).
9. The most public affirmative action initiative was California's Proposition
209, which prohibited affirmative action in public contracting, hiring, and
education. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir.
1997) (upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 209).
10. In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize assisted suicide when
voters approved a ballot measure enacting the Oregon Death With Dignity Act,
which survived a 1997 ballot measure seeking its repeal. See Gonzales v.
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 911 (2006). In 1998, Michigan, the home state of Dr.
Jack Kevorkian, also had an initiative placed on the ballot by its voters to allow
physician-assisted suicide, but it did not pass. See Assisted Suicide Law Fails in
Michigan, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 1998, at A7.
11. Recently there have been a plethora of initiatives attempting to ban gay
marriage, which have overwhelming been approved by the electorate. In 2004,
for instance, voters from eleven states passed gay marriage bans. See BALLOT
INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., 2004 ELECTION RESULTS: BALLOT INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM 5 (2004), http://ballot.org (follow "On the Ballot" hyperlink; then
follow "Election Results" hyperlink; then follow "Election Results 2004"
hyperlink; then follow "2004 Ballot Initiative & Referenda Results" hyperlink).
12. See Frank I. Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A
Critique of Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 147 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
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States.13 Republicanism is ultimately rooted in popular
sovereignty, the right to author our own laws and actively
participate in our governance. In the final analysis, as a
society, we are mostly committed to what the University of
Southern California's Beth Garrett has called "hybrid
democracy"-democracy that is both representative and
direct. 14
I. THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Direct democracy, even when it is embedded in a larger
system of representative government, is nevertheless
defective in at least four different ways, some of which are
of particular concern to deliberative democrats.
First, direct democracy, as currently designed, is
extremely susceptible to having those with access to
substantial amounts of money controlling the terms of
debate.' 5 Money influences every stage of direct democracy:
13. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-51 (1912)
(holding that challenges to direct democracy based on the Guarantee Clause
present non-justiciable political questions). For recent research on the
Guarantee Clause, see Ethan J. Leib, Redeeming the Welshed Guarantee: A
Scheme for Achieving Justiciability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 143 (2002); Robert G.
Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the
Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 814-15 (2002) (concluding
that the framers were not opposed to direct democracy). Cf. Catherine A. Rogers
& David L. Faigman, "And to the Republic for Which It Stands" Guaranteeing a
Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1996)
(arguing that direct democracy is unconstitutional under the Guarantee
Clause).
14. See Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096,
1130 (2005) (noting that more than three-quarters of Americans live under a
hybrid democracy, which is a form of government that incorporates both
representative and direct democracy as essential elements of law making). In a
nice observation about the dynamics of hybrid democracy, Garrett notes that
legislators, parties, and special interests also conversely use the power of direct
democracy to influence candidate elections. See generally Elizabeth Garrett,
Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (2005)
(describing the interplay between initiatives and voter turnout in candidate
elections in a hybrid democracy).
15. For discussion of the pervasive role of money in direct democracy, see
generally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND
THE POWER OF MONEY (2000), ELISABETH GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX:
INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999),
and Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and
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it can get things on the ballot by paying signature
gatherers; 16 it runs large-scale media campaigns that can
be calculated to confuse voters;17 and it reduces important
policy discussions to sound-bytes--often misleading ones.18
Even when initiative drives are supported by arguably
benevolent philanthropists like George Soros, rather than
trade associations looking to maximize their profits, the
influence of money is pervasive. 19 Although it is widely
known that it is much harder to buy a "yes" on an initiative
from voters than it is to buy a "no," even getting a proposal
on the ballot can give an issue salience it did not have
previously-and can effect the treatment of that issue in
the legislature. In any case, the fact that a substantial sum
of money is better at thwarting an initiative than it is at
buying a policy enactment is cold comfort to those
interested in using the initiative to enact the preferences of
the voters without being skewed by purchasing power.
Referendum Process: Evidence of its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in THE
BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001).
16. Because of the large number of signatures frequently required to get an
initiative on the ballot, signature gatherers are paid. See BRODER, supra note
15, at 52-69 (describing the signature gathering business). This can skew the
topics of initiatives from benevolent proposals to those catering to special
interests. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the
Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 35 (1995) ("Absent
from the initiative agenda are issues of concern to the poor, the less educated,
and those who lack political organization or financial resources. Instead, issues
tend to reflect the concerns of ideological or reform groups that have been
unsuccessful in getting their way with the legislature .... ). Nonetheless, it is
unconstitutional to prohibit payment to signature gatherers. See Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-27 (1988). However, recently a ban on paying
signature gatherers per signature, but not banning payment in other fashions,
e.g., on a salary, was upheld. See Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2006) (upholding ban based on government interest of combating signature
fraud).
17. See BRODER, supra note 15, at 52 ("Prop. 13 and its progeny have
spawned a huge industry devoted to the manipulation of public opinion.").
18. See, e.g., id. at 79 (detailing the misleading but effective advertisements
regarding Missouri's initiatives concerning riverboat gambling).
19. Although George Soros and fellow financiers spent several million
dollars on drug reform initiatives in spending mismatches, see Michael M.
O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Drug
Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 293, 295-96 (2003), those
figures seem almost nominal when compared with an initiative that pitted the
insurance industry against trial lawyers that brought out $60 million in
spending.
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Second, statutes put to the general population for
consideration are routinely drafted in ways that citizens
cannot understand-sometimes benignly, sometimes
subversively. 20 I recently had to abstain from an initiative
in San Francisco 21 because I could not comprehend what
the effect of my vote would be: Did I want to allocate $246
million to improve conditions at City College of San
Francisco? I had no idea what the potential alternative
allocations were.
Not only are some ballot measures simply
incomprehensible or wrenched from their context, but they
are also often drawn to confuse voters into voting
"incorrectly"-in a manner at odds with their preferences. 22
Some states have attempted to address drafting problems
20. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 118-19, 138-43 (1984) (finding that
understanding typical ballot measures in some states required a reading
comprehension level equal to that of a third-year college student, and in many
cases that of a student with multiple years of postgraduate education, causing
the vast majority of voters to not understand the meaning of proposed
legislation); see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 121-22 (1992) (discussing
voter confusion and data concerning voters who vote contrary to their preferred
outcome).
One of the benign reasons for the difficulty in comprehension is the lack of
procedural hurdles to make a poorly drafted initiative clear before it is
presented to the voters. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the
Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 78
(1995) (noting that initiatives are generally more poorly drafted than legislation
because "[1]ess expertise is brought to bear, and a small group of proponents
will overlook unintended effects and ambiguities more often than will the broad
range of interest present in the legislative process."). However, there are many
less benign reasons, where legally significant details are buried in lengthy or
complex measures. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra, at 113-14 (discussing "Trojan
horse" provisions).
21. San Francisco City & County, Proposition A (Nov. 8, 2005 Election),
available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/election/Candidates&
Campaigns/LgaltxtPropA.pdf.
22. Frequently initiative organizers attempt to manipulate the vote through
ambiguous or complex drafting. See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular
Intent" Interpretative Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 129
(1995). In California, for instance, Proposition 188, a product of the tobacco
lobby, was touted as establishing tough standardized statewide smoking
restrictions, but also had the effect of preempting tougher local ordinances. See
Robert Pear, Debate on Whose Voice Is Heard in Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1994, at Bll.
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by limiting initiatives to a single subject;23 however, the
"single subject rule" can be incredibly ineffective. 24
Incorrect voting can be measured relatively well if you ask
voters in plain English right before voting on a ballot
measure what they think and compare that expressed
preference with how they say they actually voted. Empirical
studies show that the effects of incorrect voting are
substantial insofar as it happens to more than just an
insignificant proportion of voters.25 They are robust insofar
as it happens across issue areas-in property tax issues and
affirmative action alike. 26 And they can even be decisive:
incorrect votes have sometimes ratified a result seemingly
not actually favored by the majority of voters.27
Third, empirical evidence also reveals that those who
vote in ballot measure elections are older, more educated,
23. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject
Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 954 (1983) (noting that a series of extraordinarily
diverse initiatives prompted California to adopt its single subject rule).
However, Lowenstein argues that the purposes of the single-subject rule,
including avoidance of complexity and avoidance of logrolling, are not well
served by it. See id. at 963.
24. See, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
HARv. L. REV. 434, 467 (1998) (noting that single subject requirements "have
proven extremely difficult to enforce meaningfully or consistently"). In Fair
Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 50 (Cal. 1979), for
instance, the court upheld the Political Reform Act of 1974 against a single
subject rule attack even though it contained no less than eight complex
features. Id. The court accepted the fact that complex problems required
complex solutions which could cause confusion, observing that "[u]nless we are
to repudiate or cripple use of the initiative, risk of confusion must be borne." Id.
Although this led to "the possibility that some voters might vote for the
measure ... while objecting to some parts," this was an unavoidable risk which
did not warrant rejection of the loose standards of California's single-subject
rule. Id. But see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject
Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35 (2002) (describing several states' recent trend towards
relatively strict enforcement of the single subject rule).
25. See BRODER, supra note 15, at 179 (noting that, in Washington, polls
showed a twenty-five point change in the margin of support for an anti-
affirmative action proposal when voters were told the second time they were
polled that the proposal would "effectively end affirmative action").
26. See id. at 46 (property taxes); id. at 179 (affirmative action).
27. See id. at 88 (noting that, in Massachusetts, a recycling effort was
defeated by a campaign that called the initiative a "repackaging" effort); id. at
181 (affirmative action).
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richer, and more ideological than the general population. 28
Without a representative group involved in policy
determination, a further cloud of suspicion is cast over
direct democracy. If part of the rationale for direct
democracy is that our representative institutions are failing
in actually representing the citizenry and its interests, it is
a serious problem that voters in direct democracy do not
fare much better on the representativeness scale. Although
some have argued that generally voter preferences do not
differ from nonvoter preferences, it remains true that the
rate of voting for measures of direct democracy is even
lower than it is in general elections.
Finally-and more specifically from the perspective of
deliberative democracy-substantial empirical evidence
shows that people change their minds about many policy
matters when they have had an opportunity to reflect on an
issue by reading material about the issue and discussing it
with their fellow citizens and policy experts. Experiments
by James Fishkin have proven the point time and again:
after deliberations, citizens routinely alter their preferences
in durable and unpredictable ways.29 Fishkin gathers a
random sample of citizens together over a weekend and
provides them with balanced briefing materials about an
issue. Over the weekend, each citizen has an opportunity to
discuss the issue with fellow citizens in small jury-like
settings and with politicians and stakeholder groups in
larger sessions. People trained in facilitation moderate the
groups. Throughout the weekend, Fishkin measures citizen
preference-and shows nearly every time that preferences
28. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the
Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 32 (1995) (noting
those who turn out for ballot initiatives are "better educated, older, better off,
and more ideological than voters in general elections."); MAGLEBY, supra note
20, at 108-10 (discussing the fact that poorer citizens are less likely to come to
the polls and less likely to vote on propositions, while wealthier constituents
have a "double advantage" because they are more likely to come to the polls and
more likely to vote on propositions). Also, more educated and affluent voters
read ballot materials at higher rates. See CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING,
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 247 (1992).
29. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC
OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1997); James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin,
Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in A POLL WITH A HUMAN
FACE: THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION EXPERIMENT IN POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999).
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change. He has now done this more than twenty times-in
many different countries and on many different issues,
including crime, child care, and foreign policy. 30 Given this
reality, direct democracy's reliance on "naked" preferences
is potentially troublesome because it makes little effort to
educate citizens on the issues upon which they are voting
and gives them no well-suited forum to deliberate about
those issues. Although one can reasonably question Fishkin
about whether it is the briefing materials or the
deliberations themselves that cause the changes in
preferences, 31 there can be no quarrel that the institution
as a whole produces preferences that are better considered
by participants.
II. CAN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY OFFER A SOLUTION?
With these pathologies in view (among others), 32 many
deliberative democrats simply give up on direct democracy.
As Larry Sager wrote in the Harvard Law Review,
"[1]egislation by plebiscite is not and cannot be a
deliberative process. '3 3 He and other deliberative democrats
simply use the theory of deliberative democracy to reject
direct democracy. 34 From my point of view, however,
30. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATIVE POLLING®: TOWARD A BETTER-
INFORMED DEMOCRACY, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary/ (last visited
Aug. 7, 2006) (executive summary of deliberative polling results from 1994-
2002); James S. Fishkin, The Nation in a Room: Turning Public Opinion into
Policy, BOSTON REV. Mar./Apr. 2006, at 10, available at http://boston
review.net/BR31.2/fishkin.html.
31. For this challenge, see DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE:
DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 60 (2006).
32. Additional potentially troublesome pathologies of direct democracy
include its inability to gauge preference intensity and its incapacity to allow
bargaining for compromise. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. See
Clark, supra note 24, at 456 (describing the problems of preference-intensity);
Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145,
182 (1977-1978) ("[T]he coalition process does not work in the unwieldy and
irregular referendum forum; one just wins and loses and that is all.").
33. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Saldin
and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373,
1414 (1978).
34. Many political liberals and proceduralists fall in this camp, since they
look to the courts to tell us what we would think under the right conditions and
using the best procedures. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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deliberative democracy offers a potential blueprint that can
help us devise a better way to undertake direct democracy.
A. Some Theoretical Groundwork
Before we can engage in institutional design, I need to
get a bit clearer on the version of deliberative democracy I
embrace: the details of the theory have ramifications for the
design project. Without getting too distracted by the ever-
expanding literature of deliberative democratic theory, let
me chart some coordinates on the terrain and where I locate
my approach.
First, there are some deliberative democrats who are
elitists and some who are populists. The elitists principally
urge for deliberation among elites (judges, legislators,
interest groups).35 Populists, by contrast, believe that the
benefits deliberation offers must be pursued through
popular institutions and that deliberation must take place,
first and foremost, between lay citizens.3 6 I lean towards
the populists: the legitimacy deliberation can confer accrues
more easily when it is pursued among lay citizens; elite
deliberation is also important, to be sure, but it still keeps
citizens at too far a remove and is very hard to police. 37
A second dimension: there are those who see
deliberation as the only source of legitimacy and seek to
encourage it everywhere. 38  Others recognize that all
decision-making has to be non-deliberative in some way and
The elitist version of deliberative democracy receives a definitive justification
from John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 307-08 (Geraint Williams ed., Orion Publ'g
Group 1993) (1861) ("Every one has a right to feel insulted by being made a
nobody, and stamped as of no account at all. No one but a fool ... feels offended
by the acknowledgment that there are others whose opinion, and even whose
wish, is entitled to a greater amount of consideration than his.").
35. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 34; AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
36. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative
Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (2002).
37. See ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL
FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 35-40 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, in
NEW FRENCH THOUGHT: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 186-200 (Mark Lilla ed., 1994).
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that deliberation can only be one source of legitimacy.39 We
vote to create law and that need not always be a
deliberative process-sometimes bargaining is necessary.
Moreover, there are basic rights that need to be preserved
against majorities without always being subject to
deliberation. Finally, there are problems that popular
citizen deliberation is not especially well-suited to solve-
deeply felt religious disagreements and complex tax law
may be good examples, though surely more deliberation is
warranted to decide which subjects must remain off the
proverbial table.40
This realization, that deliberation cannot do everything,
is what leads me to emphasize the separation of powers in
my conception of deliberative democracy. 4 1 Different
branches of government do different things-and not all can
be deliberative all the time. A pragmatic deliberative
democracy like mine recommends focusing on achieving
deliberation in special institutions where it can function
especially well. But this pragmatism has principle too: the
most stable, rights-enhancing regimes are actually mixed
ones, ones that combine many different modes of decision-
making in the same polity. 42 You need to protect everyone's
freedom and equality before they can come together as free
and equal to deliberate fruitfully.
Another dimension upon which deliberative democrats
can be divided is the choice about whether deliberative
institutions should be designed to form a public will or
merely to distill a better public opinion. Most believe that
39. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Pildes,
supra note 3, at 686 (2004).
40. See Schacter, supra note 22, at 164 (asserting that initiatives are not
well suited for detailed, technical laws); DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 20, at 24-
28 (noting that in Massachusetts, the initiative may not be used for measures
relating to religion, and in Alaska, Massachusetts, and Wyoming, the initiative
may not be used for measures affecting the courts). But see MATSUSAKA, supra
note 4, at 71 (arguing that citizens on average track their own fiscal preferences
relatively well through the initiative).
41. See Ethan J. Leib, Pragmatism in Designing Popular Deliberative
Institutions in the United States and China, in THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY IN CHINA 113, 121 (Ethan J. Leib & Baogang He eds., 2006).
42. This is a rather different pragmatism than that of Posner. See POSNER,
supra note 3. He thinks pragmatism endorses democratic minimalism; I think
pragmatism enables us to see that deliberative institutions, when properly
designed, can helpfully supplement more minimalist democratic practices.
913
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striving for deliberation in the context of opinion-formation
is sufficient. 43 Fishkin's deliberative polls, for example, give
us a better distillation of informed public opinion. But I
emphasize the importance of having deliberative
institutions that are given the task of making binding law-
forming a public will. It focuses deliberators on the practical
task at hand (deliberation should be about doing
something)-and it empowers them.
Finally, there is the question about whether citizens
should be made to deliberate. Although conscription is a
hard case to make, the vast majority of democrats happily
endure our mandatory jury system, the institution that de
Tocqueville praised in superlatives and suggested gave
America its true democratic character. 44 A survey of jury
studies would bear out the claim that citizens can fruitfully
deliberate under the condition of coercion. 45 Virtually every
element of our participatory democracy is affected by what
social scientists call a voluntary response problem: the
exclusion of those that select themselves out for a variety of
reasons. 46 We should avoid it if possible.
B. The Practical Design Idea: A Popular Branch
Employing this practically-oriented theory, I have
designed what I call the "popular branch of government" to
embody a joint commitment to direct democracy, popular
sovereignty, and deliberation. It is an institution targeted
to replace our current mechanisms of direct democracy, and
designed to entrust lay citizens to make policy decisions,
only after they have an opportunity to really think an issue
through. This model of decision-making can be
conceptualized as a branch, subject to checks and balances
and the separation of powers. I think I can show how this
"popular branch" helps us avoid the pathologies I outlined
above. Let me share with you some of the skeletal
43. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY
(2004).
44. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273-75 (J. P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
45. See LEIB, supra note 37, at 91 n.8.
46. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 20, at 108-10 (discussing the voluntary
response problem in voter turnout).
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mechanics of how it might work in a given government,
which might function on the state, local, or even federal
level. 47
Instead of having a ballot measure put before the entire
populace for adjudication, imagine instead a stratified
random sample of eligible voters convened for the purpose
of settling a policy question. They would be compensated
but would be required to serve to avoid the voluntary
response problem. Imagine 535 of them, the size of the U.S.
Congress, brought together to deliberate with one another
in small jury-like groups lead by carefully trained
moderators-perhaps judges-before voting on the matter
themselves. The moderators would help ensure civility,
settle factual matters, and encourage everyone to speak
their mind. Only these diverse citizens, the ones given the
opportunity to deliberate, would be able to vote on the
initiative or referendum, but their votes would be binding
law. Unlike forums such as the town hall meeting where
people rarely influence policy, or the sort of participatory
institutions the Progressives created in the early twentieth
century to educate the masses,48 my institution is designed
to make legitimate law.
A transcript of the deliberations would ultimately be
made public (though attributed to deliberators
anonymously) and questionnaires targeted to measure the
deliberators' thoughts would be administered throughout
the few days of deliberations. The transcripts are necessary
to police the moderators. But the record would also furnish
more information about citizen preferences. Very few
policies can implement themselves-legislators have been
shown to have substantial control over how and whether to
give effect to laws enacted through the mechanisms of
direct democracy. 49 The record, then, can serve as a
resource for information in designing implementation
47. For my complete proposal, see LEIB, supra note 37.
48. See KEVIN MATTSON, CREATING A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC: THE STRUGGLE FOR
URBAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1998)
(detailing a set of institutional designs that were aimed to educate the public
without direct influence on public policy).
49. See ELIZABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D.
RODERICK KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT
RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY (2001) (exploring how state legislatures do not
neatly implement every initiative statute passed by the public).
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schemes. It also furnishes a sense of preference-intensity,
something usually impossible to apprehend in traditional
forms of direct democracy. Sherman Clark's Harvard Law
Review article, The Populist Critique of Direct Democracy,
argues that direct democracy cannot take account of how
much citizens actually want something: direct democracy
tells us what most citizens want but not what they want
most.50 Not so with the popular branch's more informative
record, which legislators can use to garner the thoughtful
input of citizens.
There would also need to be an administrative body
that would be responsible for organizing the events, putting
together briefing materials, and inviting politicians and
experts to address the deliberators in plenary sessions. The
administrative body would have political appointees and
directly elected non-partisan members. There would be
ways for legislatures and the people directly to get matters
before the popular branch for consideration. And judges
could also use the resources of the popular branch. If
consulted by the judiciary in an appeal, however, the
popular branch could only have recommending force.
Lest anyone think I give the popular branch too much
power, there are several checks and balances I imagine in
the hypothetical separation of powers I propose. First, for
the popular branch to pass a law, we could institute a
supermajority decision rule. 51 Just as in the jury-our other
populist institution-we have heightened agreement
requirements, the popular branch might only be able to
enact a law with substantial support. Second, any law
passed by the popular branch could be vetoed by an
executive or a supermajority of the legislature-and could
50. See Clark, supra note 24, at 456. Therefore Clark argues that direct
democracy is in contrast with "representative government, [which] through a
combination of legislative and electoral logrolling, allows, and in fact requires,
voters to take into account the relative intensity of their various preferences in
deciding how to make use of their allotment of political power." Id. at 467. But
see Lynn A. Baker, Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 317, 338-39 (2004) (noting that representative lawmaking process or the
election of representatives does not more accurately correlate to voters'
preferences than the outcome of the plebiscite).
51. For my longer defense and analysis of supermajoritarian decision rules,
see Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 141 (2006).
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be subject to judicial review under a state or federal
constitution.
There is also a role for political parties and interest
groups. Parties would have direct access to agenda-setting
by being able to send something to the popular branch for
adjudication through the referendum (assuming they could
garner the appropriate number of votes in the relevant
houses). And they could furnish the deliberators in the
popular branch with information gathered from their
perspective. Interest groups could also get a matter before
the popular branch through the initiative process of
gathering signatures-and competing interest groups would
be involved in information-gathering and furnishing experts
for the deliberations. Money would still matter, of course,
but it would be countered by the scrutiny of deliberation. It
will be harder to confuse people when they have before
them more than a misleading television commercial.
I have some more detailed ideas for the implementation
of the popular branch but this outline is sufficient to
demonstrate how my practical proposal draws from the
theory of deliberative democracy to solve some of the
central deficiencies of direct democracy.
III. SOME LEGAL APPLICATIONS
Why should this institutional design project be of
interest to lawyers-aside from the connection to the jury?
Speaking of his imagined republic where laws would be
subjected to the deliberation of small ward-based councils,
Thomas Jefferson wrote cryptically, "[b]egin them only for a
single purpose; they will soon show for what others they are
the best instruments."52 When I began working on this
project, I was interested in showing how deliberative
democratic theory could be applied to an existing
democracy; at that time, the theoretical literature was so
self-involved that it was hard to see how the theory of
deliberative democracy could be useful for those who
wanted to reform political and legal institutions. To be fair,
that is less and less the case these days. Various members
of Columbia University's law faculty, for example, are
52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, available at
http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/P/tj3/writingsbrf/jefl241.htm).
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engaged in a movement known as "democratic
experimentalism," which draws upon deliberative
democratic theory to offer reform proposals for local
government problem-solving; 53  people in public policy
schools are also on board in a movement called
"participatory empowerment." 54
A. The Law of Direct Democracy
There are further uses for the popular branch-of
notable interest to lawyers-that can be elaborated here.
One comes by way of the law surrounding direct democracy
and the study of statutory interpretation in that context.
For example, when litigants challenge facially neutral laws
that do not on their face discriminate against a suspect
class of citizens on an equal protection theory, the Supreme
Court has held that the challenger must generally show the
discriminatory intent of the lawmakers. 55 More specifically,
when faced with the interpretation of a ballot measure,
courts tend to focus on what the voters intended when they
enacted the law, an interpretative technique known as
intentionalism. 56
53. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); see also Jamison E.
Colburn, "Democratic Experimentalism": A Separation of Powers for Our Time?,
37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 287, 288 n.3 (2004) (citing prominent democratic
experimentalism texts); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman,
Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2004).
54. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN
DEMOCRACY (2004); Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy:
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SoC'Y 5 (2001).
55. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
56. See Schacter, supra note 22, at 124 (noting that statutory interpretation
is dominated by intent-based approaches and the same holds true for
interpretation of direct legislation); O'Hear, supra note 19, at 321 (arguing that
when interpreting drug reform initiatives, courts seem to look more to the
"hypothetical intent of 'reasonable legislators acting reasonably"' than "the
actual historical intent" of the voters). Courts frequently consider statutory
intent irrespective of whether the enacting body is the legislature or the
electorate. See, e.g., State v. Gallant, 764 P.2d 920, 922 (Or. 1988) (in
determining the meaning of an ambiguous ballot measure the court tries "to
discern the intent of the legislative body; in this case, the electorate."); In re
Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 754 (Cal. 1985) ("[W]hether [a law is] enacted by the
Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount
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1. Equal Protection Jurisprudence. On the equal
protection front, take Hunter v. Erickson,57 a 1969 case
which struck down a popularly-enacted Akron city charter
amendment, held to discriminate against minorities in the
housing context. Because the statute was facially "about
race" without a compelling state justification, it failed to
survive strict scrutiny and no resort to intent analysis was
necessary. 58 But there are middle-of-the-road cases that are
not clearly facially neutral or facially discriminatory, which
require more subtle analysis. In 1982, in Washington v.
Seattle School District,59 the Court ostensibly applied
Hunter to hold an anti-busing ordinance passed through the
mechanisms of direct democracy unconstitutional, even
though it was not quite clearly discriminatory on its face-
and even though the Court claimed not to be engaging in
intent analysis. Adhering to its 1971 decision in James v.
Valtierra,60 where the Court made very clear that facial
consideration."). However, many of the "familiar problems of intentionalism
writ large" are far more difficult with popular intent. Schacter, supra note 22,
at 124-25 (noting problems of aggregating multiple individual voters intentions
and of differential understanding of terms or phrases is even more pronounced
with voters making the search for popular intent intractable).
Additionally, the presence of riders further confounds the search for popular
intent of direct democracy because states' single-subject rules are largely
ineffective. See Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 961-63 (noting that the danger of
riders to popular proposals will usually be worked out by the legislature and
that even a strict interpretation of the single subject rule is ill-equipped to
thwart the sinister effects of riders). An example from the recent proliferation of
same-sex marriage bans exemplifies these difficulties. See Perdue v. O'Kelley,
632 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 2006). In Georgia, 76% of the electorate approved a
constitutional amendment that contained two proposals: it reserved "marriage"
for opposite-sex couples and denied any civil union benefits to same-sex couples.
See Brenda Goodman, Georgia Court Upholds a Referendum Banning Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at A14. This initiative survived Georgia's
single subject rule because each proposition of the amendment was not
"dissimilar and discordant" with the other, i.e., each proposition was not
completely non-germane to the other. Purdue, 632 S.E.2d at 113. However, this
interpretation of the single subject rule leaves us in a difficult situation since
we do not know how many people understood and approved both parts of the
proposal on which they were voting; divining the voter's intent is a mess.
57. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
58. Id. at 390-91 (holding that amendment of city charter to provide that
any ordinance enacted by city council which regulates use, sale, advertisements,
transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease, or financing of realty on basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry must first be approved by
majority of electors violated the Equal Protection Clause).
59. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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neutrality presents nearly insuperable evidentiary
problems because it is hard to get behind the private vote,
the Seattle School District Court nevertheless held that the
ordinance was obviously targeted against racial
minorities. 61 Of course, a place to see the Court engaged in
intent analysis directly is Romer v. Evans,62 the 1996
Supreme Court case which struck down a popularly-enacted
amendment to Colorado's Constitution, held to discriminate
improperly against gays. In Romer, the Court plainly held
that voters had discriminatory intent or animus in passing
their ballot measure. 63
Because facial neutrality is becoming the routine
method of sophisticated initiative and referendum drives,
many courts and scholars have struggled to figure out just
what sort of evidence could be probative of popular intent in
the legislation of direct democracy. 64 The popular branch-
with its detailed transcripts and questionnaires
60. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
61. See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 484-86 (holding that selective
reallocation of power from local to state level regarding busing for purposes of
integration but not busing for other education purposes was clearly meant to
make it more difficult to desegregate schools). The case of Arthur v. City of
Toledo, concerning a set of referenda to disallow sewage extensions into low and
moderate income housing projects challenged by the presumptive beneficiaries,
also emphasizes just how difficult it is to determine discriminatory intent. 782
F.2d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a court may not inquire into possible
racist motives for facially neutral referendum "unless racial discrimination was
the only possible motivation behind the ... results.").
62. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional an amendment to
Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial
action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination).
63. Id. at 635 (noting that the amendment did not "further a proper
legislative end" but instead was intended to make homosexuals "unequal to
everyone else").
64. See Schacter, supra note 22, at 123. Courts frequently rely on formal
legal sources, such as official ballot materials, especially any ballot pamphlet
required by law to be provided to voters. These "are generally used like
legislative history" in interpreting ballot measures. See id. at 113-23. However,
voters infrequently read and rely on these formal legal sources and much more
frequently consult and seek guidance from informal sources such as television
advertisements or media reports. See id. at 130-44. These informal sources are
not utilized by courts in attempting to divine legislative intent. See O'Hear,
supra note 19, at 320; see also Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 506 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.
Miss. 1981), aff'd 663 F.2d 622, reh'g denied 669 F.2d 316, 317 (1982) (excluding
admission of Gallup poll showing electorate's racialized reasons for vote on
citywide referendum).
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administered before and after deliberation-could provide
extremely useful information for courts performing their
analysis of popular intent. Moreover, the design I have
recommended might address the concerns of many law
professors 65 who argue that courts should exact extra-
scrutiny upon laws passed directly by the citizenry. The
more deliberative forum offers us more reason to treat the
resulting policies with at least as much respect or deference
as laws passed by our legislators.66
2. Statutory Interpretation. Even if a court is facing the
more mundane task of simply interpreting a statute passed
through directly-democratic means and not trying to figure
out whether it survives federal constitutional scrutiny,
courts would have at their disposal much more information
to perform their interpretative tasks and their gap-filling.
For example, three-strikes-and-you're-out laws6 7 and drug-
sentencing reform 68 are often undertaken through the
65. See Eule, supra note 4, at 1559 (asserting that a "harder look" judicial
review is necessary when a plebiscite could harm individual rights or
undermine the equal application of the law); see also Schacter, supra note 22, at
159 (proposing interpretative rules to address problems in the democratic
process); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 503 (1996) (proposing
special canons of statutory interpretation to address deficiencies of direct
democracy); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2748, 2767-68 (2005) (recommending a flexible model of statutory interpretation
tailored to the type of legislation at issue).
66. Additionally, the popular branch might discourage individuals from
supporting legislation that could harm racial minorities. See Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV.
1, 14-15 (1978) (arguing that the privacy of the voting booth makes "the
referendum . . . a most effective facilitator of that bias, discrimination, and
prejudice which has marred American democracy from its earliest day.").
Although the popular branch would retain the secrecy of each individual's
private vote and although the branch would not encourage preference-
falsification, the publicity of the event might encourage open-mindedness and
exact some shame on racists.
67. The first three-strikes law was passed by initiative in Washington
(Initiative 593) in 1993; then California passed a similar law in 1994
(Proposition 184). See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15 (2003).
68. Medical marijuana was first legalized by initiative in 1996, and was
followed two years later by successful drug reform initiatives in five other
states. See BRODER, supra note 15, at 191-96; see also O'Hear, supra note 19, at
292-97 (describing the enactment of the drug treatment initiatives in Arizona
and California).
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initiative process. But not every statutory scheme covers
every possible case. It then falls to courts to fill in statutory
gaps. 69 With the deliberations of citizens being transcribed
and serving as legislative history, courts will more readily
be equipped to figure out, for example, if the voters wanted
to allow a petty crime (like stealing a golf club) to count as
the third strike7° or whether, instead, they intended an
"interests of justice" exception.
B. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process is also a thicket the popular
branch can bushwhack. In Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion in Griswold,71 he explains the predicament in which
judges find themselves in substantive due process cases,
where judges seek to decide whether something is a
fundamental right under the Constitution: "In determining
which rights are fundamental, judges [cannot] decide cases
in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they
must look to the traditions and collective conscience of our
people." 72 Consider Justice Black's retort:
One may ask how [judges] can avoid considering [their personal
prejudices]. Our Court certainly has no machinery with which to
take a Gallup Poll. And the scientific miracles of this age have not
yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what
traditions are rooted in the collective conscience of our people. 73
I suggest that the popular branch may be just such a
gadget. Justices Kennedy and Scalia could have used some
informed and thoughtful popular input in settling the
questions of history and tradition raised by Lawrence v.
Texas74 in 2003, which found the right to sexual privacy to
69. See O'Hear, supra note 19, at 302-19 (detailing how courts fill in the
gaps in drug treatment initiatives).
70. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11 (upholding the defendant's twenty-five years
to life sentence given as a result of his third strike, which was a conviction for
felony grand theft when he stole three golf clubs).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
74. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Although Justices Kennedy and Justice Scalia
appealed to a slightly different framing of the specific generality of right that
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be fundamental. The popular branch would help counter
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, even if judges get the
final say in the judicial branch.
C. Zoning Law
There are still other applications for a popular branch
in local zoning decisions. In the zoning law context, courts
are a bit more circumspect about allowing for direct
democracy because the decisions routinely are directed
against a small class of stakeholders, rendering the
adjudication much more personal and private, much more
like a civil judicial proceeding. 75 Still, there is great
enthusiasm on the part of cities to allow zoning decisions to
be made through the mechanisms of direct democracy,
perhaps because local regulators are often captured by the
very interests they are supposed to regulate. 76 Maybe there
would be less judicial concern if the forum were more
deliberative and more like a jury's private adjudication. A
small convention of the popular branch to settle such
disputes may be warranted.
D. Administrative Law
There are also potential applications for the popular
branch in administrative law. 77 Current designs in the
was relevant in Lawrence, their conclusions regarding history and tradition
were nonetheless at odds with each other. Justice Kennedy claimed that
"[tihere is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter," id. at 568, and that "American laws
targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th
century," id. at 570. By contrast, Justice Scalia claimed that homosexual
sodomy is not a right 'deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition,"' id.
at 596 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986)) and that "sodomy laws were enforced against consenting adults," id. at
597.
75. See, e.g., Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.)
(upholding a challenge to local option liquor law allowing voters in county to
vote county "dry").
76. See, e.g., Assoc. Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
77. See generally David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure
Act: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2005) (applying
insights of deliberative democratic theory to develop a recommendation to
incentivize agencies to undertake more deliberative and participatory
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process known as Regulatory Negotiation ("RegNeg"),
where interest groups get together in a room with
regulators to hash out compromises, are thought by many
to be severely inadequate.78 A convention of the popular
branch, to which administrators and stakeholders had tojustify their positions and win ratification for their
rulemaking efforts, might be a way to rejuvenate and
legitimate that other "fourth branch."
CONCLUSION
I cannot pursue all of these potential legal applications
here in any detail; in the spirit of this Essay issue, these are
mere provocations. But I hope I have made the central point
of my case: deliberative democracy, once used as a
theoretical orientation to undermine and critique direct
democracy, can actually be used as a tool in the hands of
institutional designers for bettering our practices of direct
democracy. There is no doubt that they could use some
rulemaking processes). In particular, there has been a great deal of enthusiasm
for the potential deliberative benefits conferred by e-rulemaking. See Cary
Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
DUKE L.J. 943 (2006) (assessing the value of e-rulemaking); Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 440 (2004) ("The new
portals for notice and comment help make the public comment process more
interactive and deliberative. This . . . increases public participation and
democratic legitimacy."); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 434 (2004); Peter M. Shane, Turning GOLD
into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic
Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy, 1 INFO. Soc'Y J.L. POL'Y
147, 159 (2005), available at http://www.is-journal.orgVOlIOl/I-S,%20VO1-I0l-
P147,%2OShane.pdf (reviewing DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik
Olin Wright eds., 2003)) (arguing that administrative e-rulemaking has the
potential to create a vigorous public sphere and should draw from deliberative
democracy).
78. See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DuKE L.J.
1351, 1356 (1997) (arguing that "negotiated rulemaking [establishes] ...
privately bargained interests as the source of putative public law" and "subtly
subvert[s] the basic, underlying concepts of American administrative law-an
agency's pursuit of the public interest through law and reasoned
decisionmaking."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A
Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DuKE L.J. 1206, 1211 (1994)
(noting that negotiated settlements, without involvement from interested
parties, can result in a lack of democratic legitimacy).
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fixing. And lawyers could also gain substantial advantages
in navigating certain thorny legal problems and institutions
by adopting a version of the particular solution to direct
democracy's woes that I construct from the theoretical
edifice of deliberative democracy.

